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Abstract—Fog computing is a promising architecture to pro-
vide economic and low latency data services for future Internet
of things (IoT)-based network systems. It relies on a set of low-
power fog nodes that are close to the end users to offload the
services originally targeting at cloud data centers. In this paper,
we consider a specific fog computing network consisting of a set
of data service operators (DSOs) each of which controls a set of
fog nodes to provide the required data service to a set of data
service subscribers (DSSs). How to allocate the limited computing
resources of fog nodes (FNs) to all the DSSs to achieve an optimal
and stable performance is an important problem. In this paper,
we propose a joint optimization framework for all FNs, DSOs
and DSSs to achieve the optimal resource allocation schemes in
a distributed fashion. In the framework, we first formulate a
Stackelberg game to analyze the pricing problem for the DSOs
as well as the resource allocation problem for the DSSs. Under
the scenarios that the DSOs can know the expected amount of
resource purchased by the DSSs, a many-to-many matching game
is applied to investigate the pairing problem between DSOs and
FNs. Finally, within the same DSO, we apply another layer of
many-to-many matching between each of the paired FNs and
serving DSSs to solve the FN-DSS pairing problem. Simulation
results show that our proposed framework can significantly
improve the performance of the IoT-based network systems.
Index Terms — Fog computing, Stackelberg game, match-
ing theory, Internet of things.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet of things (IoT), the
number of connected devices has increased at a unprecedented
speed [1]. It is known that analyzing the big data generated by
all kinds of IoT devices requires a large amount of computing
resources. In order to meet the demand of the data computing
services, a large number of large-scale data centers has been
deployed. In addition, cloud computing has been proposed
recently to provide flexible and efficient services to the data
service subscribers (DSSs). In cloud computing, the data
service operator (DSO) is able to organize a shared pool of
configurable computing resources (such as servers, storage,
networks, applications and services), which can be easily
accessed by DSSs on demands.
Generally speaking, large-scale data centers or clouds are
generally built in remote areas which are far from the DSSs.
This results in high transmission cost and service latency
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which can be intolerable for the IoT applications that requires
real-time interaction or mobility. In order to overcome these
challenges, fog computing is proposed as a promising solution.
In fog computing, multiple low-power computing devices,
commonly referred to as the fog nodes (FN), at the edge
of the networks are deployed to offload the data computing
services from the cloud. With the property of small-scale, low
construction cost and mobility support, the FNs are generally
deployed much closer to the DSSs and therefore can provide
low-latency fast-response and location-awareness service [2].
Fog computing networks can consist of a large number
of FNs deployed by different DSOs at different locations to
provide various data services and applications to the DSSs.
When DSSs can choose their DSOs as well as the corre-
sponding FNs to further enhance their quality-of-experience,
how to allocate the limited computing resources of all the fog
nodes to the DSSs is still an open problem. In this paper,
we further extend our previous work [3] and focus on the
resource selection and allocation problem between the FNs,
DSOs and DSSs. We propose a joint optimization framework
for all FNs, DSOs and DSSs in a distributed fashion. In the
framework, we first formulate a Stackelberg game to model the
interaction between DSOs and DSSs, where the DSOs set their
service price first, and the DSSs purchase the optimal amount
2of computing resource blocks (CRBs) correspondingly. Once
the prices of DSOs and the purchased resources of DSSs
have been obtained, each DSS can know how many CRBs are
required and can then try to compete for the CRBs owned by
the nearby FNs. Thus, we propose a many-to-many matching
game to investigate the interaction between DSOs and FNs
where each DSO has a set of CRBs to offload, and each FN
has many vacant CRBs to sell. After all the DSOs decide their
DSO-FN pairs, FNs will compete with each other to allocate
their CRBs to the DSSs of the DSOs. We also adopt another
layer of many-to-many matching framework to solve the FN-
DSS pairing problem within the same DSO. Simulation results
show that our proposed framework can significantly improve
the performance of the fog computing networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe
the system model in Section II and formulate the problems in
Section III. Based on the formulated problem, we analyze the
system with the proposed framework in Section IV, where
the interaction between DSOs and DSSs is considered in
Section IV-A, the interaction between FNs and DSOs is
analyzed in Section IV-B, and the interaction between FNs
and DSSs is discussed in Section IV-C. Finally, we evaluate
the performance of our work in Section V, show related works
in Section VI and summarize the paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a fog computing network where each DSS can
submit its data computing service to a set of neighboring
FNs deployed by a set of DSOs as illustrated in Figure 1.
Accordingly, we consider a three-tier fog network, where
the DSOs locate in the middle layer, managing the FNs
in the upper layer and serving DSSs in the bottom layer.
Without loss of generality, we assume there are M DSOs,
labeled as Ψ = {d1, d2, . . . , dM} and N DSSs, denoted
as Υ = {s1, s2, . . . , sN}. Let λj be the workload arrival
rate of DSS sj , ∀sj ∈ Υ. We assume each DSS has a
normalized preference list, denoted as Lsj over all DSOs.
Moreover, K FNs, labeled as Ω = {f1, f2, . . . , fK}, locate
in the area of consideration. We define the unit amount of
computing resources that can be distributed by each FN as
the “computing resource block (CRB)” [3], each of which
can provide computing service at the rate of µ. The physical
data transmission network between FNs and DSSs satisfies
the SecondNet topology [4], where the network facilities can
provide the guaranteed quality-of-service (QoS) for the DSSs.
Accordingly, in order to reduce the risk of potential network
congestion and achieve real-time fast-response interaction,
each DSO tries to offload the data services submitted by the
DSSs to the large-scale data centers to the local FNs. However,
as the DSSs cannot have the authorization to access the
CRBs directly, the DSSs are required to receive the virtualized
services from the DSOs, and with the management of DSOs,
the CRBs of the FNs can finally be allocated to the DSSs. We
assume that different DSOs offer data services with different
requirements. Based on the preference list Lsj , the DSS sj ,
∀sj ∈ Υ is required to subscribe to at most one DSO. The
network architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1.
TABLE I: List of Notations
Symbol Definition
M Total number of DSOs
N Total number of DSSs
K Total number of FNs
Ψ The set of DSOs
Υ The set of DSSs
Ω The set of FNs
µ Service rate of CRBs
λj Workload arrival rate for the DSS sj
ri Price of unit virtualized CRB set by the DCO oi
L
s
j The preference list of DSSs over DSOs
tj Total cost due to the delay of DSS sj
hj Cost due to network delay from the physical ser-
vice provider to DSS sj
oj Cost due to queuing delay at the servers
qj Total amount of CRBs purchased by the DSS sj
lkj Distance between the FN fk and the DSS sj
W sj Utility function of DSS sj
W di Utility function of DSO di
W
f
k
Utility function of FN fk
τij The boolean variable determining whether the DSO
di serves DSS sj or not.
αj , βj , γj Weight factors in the utility function of DSS sj
tth The maximum tolerance of service delay for DSS
sj
ckj Transmission cost for unit CRB from FN fk to
DSS sj
ei Increment of the energy cost in the massive data
center for DSO di
η
f
ki
Normalized preference from the FN fk to the DSO
di
pk Rent of unit CRB set by the FN fk
rth Upper bound of total delay cost
q
fs
kj
Amount of CRBs allocated from the FN fk to the
DSS sj
q
fd
ik
Amount of CRBs allocated from the FN fk to the
DSO di
L
df
i Preference list of DSO di on all FNs
L
sf
j Preference list of DSS sj on all FNs
L
fs
k
Preference list of FN fk on all DSSs
Assume the DSSs apply real-time interactive applications,
where QoS is measured by the service delay. In this paper, for
DSS sj , ∀sj ∈ Υ, we measure the cost of the service delay
as
tj = hj + oj , (1)
which consists of the cost caused by the queuing delay oj at
the servers as well as the cost caused by the network delay
hj from the sensors to the physical service provider and from
the physical service provider to DSS sj .
According to the queuing delay model in [5], [7], which
can be easily extended to other models, the cost of queuing
delay when serving DSS sj is
oj =
λj
µ−
λj
qj
, (2)
where qj is the amount of CRBs purchased by DSS sj .
Moreover, as the network delay is related to the transmission
distance, traffic condition in the network and many other
unpredicted factors, in real situations, we suppose the network
delay can be evaluated from training data periodically sent
from sensors to the physical service provider and from the
3physical service provider to the DSS. In this paper, we
set the distance between the farthest sensor to the physical
service provider plus the distance between the physical service
provider (e.g., FN fk) to DSS sj is denoted as lkj . For
simplicity, we assume the network resource from the physical
service provider to DSS sj is sufficient, and the cost incurred
by the network delay hj generally follows a linear function of
the distance from the sensor to the physical service provider
plus the distance from the physical service provider to the DSS
sj , i.e., hj = θlkj , where θ is the scalar.
As the DSSs in the network pay DSOs for the service,
following the structure of [3], the utility of DSS sj , ∀j ∈ Υ,
can be denoted as the revenue received from the workload
data minus both the cost of service delay and payment to the
DSOs as follows:
W sj =
M∑
i=1
τij (αjλj − βjqjri − γjtj) , (3)
where ri is the price set by DSS di for each unit of the
virtualized CRB. αj , βj , and γj are weight factors. τij is
the boolean variable determining whether DSO di serves DSS
sj or not. If τij = 1, DSS sj is served by the DSO di.
Otherwise, DSS sj prefers to be served by other DSOs. The
value of τij follows the preference list Lsj of DSS sj , and
since each DSS can at most choose one DSS, i.e.,
M∑
i=1
τij = 1,
∀j ∈ Υ. For each DSS, assume there is an upper bound
tth for the service delay. When the service delay is larger
than the threshold, the DSS will regard it as an unsuccessful
connection. Corresponding, we set qthj as the lower bound
of CRBs required for DSS sj to guarantee the service delay
within the acceptable boundaries.
Based on the amount of virtualized CRB purchased by
serving DSSs, the utility of each DSO is the revenues received
from the DSSs minus the payment to the facilities that are
able to provide the physical CRBs. Each DSO prefers to
offload its services to the FNs nearby. However, if there are
not sufficient amount of CRBs from the FNs which can meet
the requirements of all DSSs. Some DSSs will be served by
the massive data centers, which are located far away from the
DSSs. We suppose the increment of the energy cost in the
massive data center is ei. Therefore, for the DSO di, if qfdik
amount of CRBs are offloaded to the FN fk, and qoi amount of
CRBs are still served by the massive data centers, the utility
function of DSO di, ∀i ∈ Ψ, can be denoted as
W di =
N∑
j=1
τij(riqj)−
K∑
k=1
pkq
fd
ik − eiq
o
i . (4)
pk is the price set by the FN fk, which is determined by the
cost and current traffic of FN fk.
For FN fk in the network, the utility is the payment received
from the DSOs minus the transmission cost. We set ckj
as the transmission cost for each unit CRB, which has a
linear relationship with the distance lkj . Moreover, we set
ηfki as the normalized preference to the DSO di. Accordingly,
considering the preference to different DSOs, the discounted
utility function for each DSO is
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Fig. 2: A joint optimization framework
W fk =
K∑
k=1
ηfki (pk − ckj) q
fs
kj , (5)
where qfskj is the amount of CRBs allocated from FN fk to
DSS sj .
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
According to the modeled architecture of fog network, with
tradings between FNs and DSOs and between DSOs and
DSSs, it is impossible to reach the maximum utilities for
all FNs, MDCOs and DSSs simultaneously. Accordingly, we
consider a sequential decision making process. During the
process, the DSOs first predict the total amount of CRBs
purchased from their servings DSSs and set their service
prices to their DSSs based on the prediction. Observing the
behaviors of the DSOs, each DSS determines the optimal
amount of CRBs to purchase to achieve the maximum utility.
Furthermore, knowing the total amount of required CRBs, the
DSOs try to allocate CRBs to the FNs in the neighborhood.
Finally, all FNs selected by the same DSO competes for the
DSSs.
We can write the optimization problem can be formulated
as follows.
max
qj
W sj (qj |r), ∀j ∈ Υ,
s.t.

M∑
i=1
τij = 1,
tj ≤ tth,
τijαjλj ≤ τij (βjqjri + γjtj),
qj ≥ 0,
τij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ Ψ,
(6)
where r is the pricing profile of all DSOs observed by DSS
sj .
4Predicting the behaviors of the DSSs, each DSO is required
to set the service price to each serving DSS and compete with
other DSOs to choose FNs in the neighborhood. Thus, the
formulated problem of the DSO is
max
ri
W di (ri|q
∗,p, r∗
−i), ∀i ∈ Ψ,
s.t.

N∑
j=1
τij(riqj) ≥
K∑
k=1
pkq
fd
ik + eiq
o
i ,
ri ≥ 0,
(7)
where q∗ denotes the optimal amount of CRBs purchased by
all DSSs. p is the profile of rent for all FNs. r∗
−i is the profile
of optimal service prices set by other DSOs.
Moreover, each FN in the network would like to choose
its preferred DSOs and serve its DSSs with low distance.
Thus, competing with other FNs, it is required to determine
the amount of CRBs allocated to DSOs and its serving DSSs,
respectively. The optimization problem is denoted as
max
q
fd
ik
,q
fs
kj
W fk (q
fd
ik , q
fs
kj |q
∗,qfd∗i−k,q
fs∗
−kj ,p−k), ∀k ∈ Ω,
s.t.

M∑
i=1
qfdik ≤ q
f−th
k ,
N∑
j=1
qfskj ≤ q
f−th
k ,
K∑
k=1
qfdik ≤ q
d−th
i , ∀i ∈ Ψ,
K∑
k=1
qfskj ≤ q
s−th
j , ∀j ∈ Υ,
(8)
where qfdi−k is the optimal amount of CRBs rent to DSO di for
all other FNs, qfs∗
−kj is the optimal amount of CRBs allocated
to DSS sj for all other FNs. During the service, the total
CRBs distributed to all DSOs or all DSSs cannot exceed its
total available CRBs qf−thk for FN fk. Furthermore, the total
CRBs purchased from DSO di or DSS sj should not exceed
its demand qd−thi or q
s−th
j , respectively.
In summary, following the relationships among all FNs,
DSOs and DSSs, we focus on the following problems:
1) Resource purchasing problem for the DSSs: In the
network, as the DSSs can only access to the DSOs in
a virtualized fashion, they are required to purchase the
optimal amount of CRBs from the DSOs. Following the
system model, as different DSSs have different tolerance
of service delay, when the upper bound of service delay
is high, the DSSs are able to purchase a small amount
of CRBs to achieve satisfying services. However, when
the upper bound of service delay is low, the DSSs have
to purchase a large amount of CRBs to guarantee the
service delay is within the tolerated region. Moreover,
the service price set by the DSOs also affects the utility
of DSSs. When the price is in high value, even though
the large amount of CRBs is able to improve the quality
of data services, the DSSs have to make a large payment
to the DSOs for their services. The revenue may not
be satisfying. Therefore, considering both the delay
tolerance and setting prices of DSOs, the optimal amount
of CRBs should be determined for high utilities.
2) Pricing problem for the DSOs: In the data service with
fog, the DSOs are required to provide virtualized CRBs
to the DSSs and try to rent the CRBs from the FNs to
serve DSSs in the physical network. Therefore, how to
do the pricing for the DSOs is a problem. Considering
the announced rent from all FNs, the DSOs need to set
a price which can bring profits for themselves. However,
if the price is set too high, the serving DSSs will not
purchase a large amount of CRBs. Therefore, predicting
the reactions of CRBs and observing the rent of FNs,
the DSOs are required to determine its service price so
as to receive the maximum revenues.
3) DSO-FN pairing problem: As FNs may be private
computing devices, which are small-scale and unable to
communicate with DSSs directly, the FNs are accessible
to the DSOs only. In the multi-DSO scenario, as the FNs
are accessible to all DSOs, it is a problem for all DSOs
in the network to pair FNs distributedly so as to serve
their DSSs with low latency. With different relations and
trading history, each FN has different preference on all
DSOs. Observing the rent of all FNs, each DSO also
has a preferences on each FN. Based on the preferences
of all DSOs’ and FNs’, it is required to reach a stable
DSO-FN pairing results, where any DSO or FN is able
switch its current pairing result for a higher utility.
4) FN-DSS pairing problem: After the pairing between
DSOs and FNs, each FN has allocated its CRBs to all
DSOs. However, within one DSO, it is still a problem
for the FNs to allocate their CRBs to all DSSs. As the
distance between each FN and each DSS is various,
with a longer transmission distance, the FNs have to
pay more on the transmission cost. Thus, based on the
transmission distance, each FN has a preference over
all DSSs. Moreover, each DSS also have preference
over FNs based on the rent. Therefore, following the
preference of all FNs’ and DSSs’, a stable FN-DSS
pairing result should be achieved.
According to the formulated problems, all FNs, DSOs and
DSSs are rational and autonomous individuals, who observe
the behaviors of others and make decisions to improve their
own utilities. Therefore, in order to reach the optimal and
stable solutions for all FNs, DSOs and DSSs, we model a
three-stage joint optimization framework, as shown in Fig.
2. In the framework, we first model the Stackelberg games
to solve the pricing problem for the DSOs and resource
purchasing problem for the DSSs. When the DSOs know the
expected amount of resource purchased by the DSSs, a many-
to-many matching is proposed between the DSOs and the FNs
to deal with the DSO-FN pairing problem. Finally, within
the same DSO, we apply another many-to-many matching
between its paired FNs and serving the DSSs to solve the
FN-DSS pairing problem.
IV. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the optimal strategies for FNs,
DSOs and DSSs. Based on the analysis of the formulated
5framework, in the following sub-sections, we first investigate
the interactions between the DSOs and DSSs to determine
how many CRBs are required during the service. Given the
optimized behaviors of the DSOs and DSSs, we analyze the
interactions between the FNs and DSOs based on different
preferences. Finally, with the obtained results, we discuss the
interactions between the FNs and DSSs within the same DSO
for better services.
A. The Interaction between DSOs and DSSs
In the virtualized network, the DSOs provides CRBs for
the DSSs. Following the formulated problems for both DSOs
and DSSs, there is a Stackelberg game, where the DSOs act as
leaders and DSSs act as followers. In the game, when all DSSs
choose their serving DSOs with their preferences, the DSO
first sets the service price. Then, based on the price all DSSs
determine optimal amount of CRBs to purchase. Accordingly,
considering the optimization problem of DSSs, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. In the modeled Stackelberg game between DSO di
and DSS sj , when the DSO announces its service price ri, the
optimal amount of CRBs qj purchased by the DSS is
q∗j =
λj
µ
√
ri
βj
γj
+
λj
µ
. (9)
Proof: According to the utility function of DSS sj 3, the
second derivative of W sj with respect to qj is
∂2W sj
∂q2j
= −
2λ2jµ
(µqj − λj)
3
. (10)
As ∂
2W sj
∂q2
j
< 0, W sj is a quasi-concave function with respect
to qj . Furthermore, the first derivative of W sj with respect to
qj is
∂W sj
∂qj
=
(
λj
µbj − λj
)2
− ri
βj
γj
. (11)
We set the first derivative equal to zero and obtain the optimal
amount of CRBs to purchase so as to achieve the maximum
utility, i.e,
q∗j =
λj
µ
√
ri
βj
γj
+
λj
µ
. (12)
Therefore, considering the reactions of the DSSs, we adjust
the optimization problem for the DSO di, ∀i ∈ Ψ, as follows.
max
ri
W˜ di (ri|q
∗,p, r∗
−i), ∀i ∈ Ψ,
s.t.

N∑
j=1
τij(
λj
µ
√
βj
γj
ri +
λj
µ
√
βj
γj
ri) ≥
K∑
k=1
pkq
fd
ik + eiq
o
i ,
ri ≥ 0,
(13)
where
W˜ di =
N∑
j=1
τij(
λj
µ
√
βj
γj
ri +
λj
µ
√
βj
γj
ri)−
K∑
k=1
pkq
fd
ik − eiq
o
i .
(14)
In the formulated problem (13), we take the first derivative
of W˜ di with respective to ri and discover it is a monotonous
increasing function with respective to ri. Furthermore, as the
service delay cannot surpass tth for the DSSs. The CRB
purchased by DSSs has the following low bound
qj ≥
λjtth
µtth − λj
. (15)
Thus, following the relation in (9), the maximum and optimal
price for the DSO di to DSS sj is, ∀i ∈ Ψ, ∀j ∈ Υ,
ri =
γj
βj
(
µtth − λj
λj
)2
. (16)
B. The Interaction between FNs and DSOs
According to the predicted amount of CRBs ordered by the
DSSs, the DSOs try to offload the services from the massive
data centers to the DSSs nearby. Observing the service prices
set by all FNs, DSO di, ∀i ∈ Ψ, has a preference list Ldfi =[
Ldfi1 , . . . , L
df
iK
]
on all FNs in the neighborhood. As the DSOs
prefer to choose the FNs with a low price, we set
Ldfik = −pk, ‘∀i ∈ Ψ, ∀k ∈ Ω. (17)
Furthermore, each FN also has different preferences over
DSOs. Thus, we set the preference list of FN fk, ∀k ∈ Ω,
on all DSOs as Lfdk =
[
Lfd
1k , . . . , L
df
Mk
]
, satisfying,
Lfdik = η
f
ki, ‘∀i ∈ Ψ, ∀k ∈ Ω. (18)
Considering the preference lists of FNs and DSOs, i.e., Ldfik
and Lfdik , respectively, we design a many-to-many matching
algorithm for the DSO-FN pairing problem. As shown in
Algorithm 1, after the preference lists are constructed, we set
a pointer for each FN in its preference list. Initially, we set the
pointer at the first DSO in the list. During the each round of
matching, each FN first propose to the DSO in the pointer of
the preference list. Based on behaviors of the FNs, each DSO
chooses its most preferred FNs in its preference list until the
required CRBs are all supplied by the FNs. If the FNs supply
more CRBs than the DSO requires, the DSO will reject the
CRBs from less favourite FNs. If the FNs supplies less CRBs
than the DSO requires, the DSO will choose massive data
centers for the rest of the services. At the end of each round,
if all of the CRBs from the FN have been allocated to the
DSOs, the pointers of the FN will keep unchanged. Otherwise,
the pointers of the rejected FNs will move to the next DSO
in the preference list. In the next round, the FNs which still
have available CRBs will propose to the new DSOs according
to their pointers. Specifically, if the CRBs of FN are chosen
by the DSO in the last round, but discarded in the current
round, we suppose the pointer of the FN doesn’t change its
position, considering the pointed DSO in the current round
6Algorithm 1 Many-to-Many Matching Algorithm for DSO-
FN pairing problem.
1: for FN fk do
2: Construct the preference list Lfdk on all DSOs according
to (18);
3: One pointer is set as the indicator pointing at the first
DSO in the preference list.
4: end for
5: for DSO di do
6: Construct the preference list Ldfi on all FNs according
to (17);
7: end for
8: We set flagk, ∀k ∈ Ω, as the indicator to show if the
CRBs of FN fk were chosen by the DSO in the last round,
but discarded in the current round. Initially, flagk = 1;
9: while the pointers of all FNs have not scanned all the
DSOs in their preference list do
10: FNs propose to DSOs with their service price;
11: for FN fk who still have available FNs to purchase do
12: if flagk = 1 then
13: The pointer keep current position in the list;
14: else
15: The pointer moves to the next position in the list;
16: end if
17: The FN proposes to pointed DSO in its preference
list with its available FNs;
18: We set flagk = 0;
19: end for
20: DSOs determines which FNs to choose;
21: for DSO di do
22: if The total available amount of CRBs proposed by
the FNs exceed the requirements then
23: The DSO di chooses the most preferred amount of
CRBs from FNs, and rejects the rest;
24: For CRBs of the FN fk which is chosen by the
DSO in the last round, but rejected in the current
round, we set flagk = 1;
25: end if
26: end for
27: end while
may need more CRBs from the FN. The matching repeats in
circulations until all the pointers of the FNs have moved out
their preference list. According to the algorithm, we have the
following lemmas.
Lemma 2. For each FN in the matching algorithm, the pointer
of the FN in its preference list moves in one direction. In other
words, when its pointer has moved to the next DSOs in the
preference list, whatever the matching results of other FNs,
the FN cannot achieve a higher utility by moving the pointer
back.
Proof: As shown in Algorithm 2, when the DSOs deter-
mines which FNs to choose, they choose the CRBs from the
most preferred amount. If some CRBs from FN fk is discarded
by DSO di, the current accepted CRBs belong to the FNs
which is more preferred than FN fk. In the future rounds, when
there are new FNs proposing to DSO di, if the DSO would
like to change its current accepted FNs, the DSO can only
choose the FNs that is even better than the FNs in the current
accepted list. Therefore, for FN fk which has been rejected
once from DSO di, it is impossible for it to be accepted by
the same DSO in the future rounds.
Lemma 3. Following the Algorithm 2, the DSO-FN pairing
problem will ultimately converge and achieve a stable match-
ing result.
Proof: As proved in the Lemma 2, the pointer of the FNs
can only move in one direction. Therefore, in the perspective
of the FNs, when the pointer of each FN has moved to the
end of the preference list, the FN has distributed its available
CRBs to the DSOs in an optimized way. In other words, the FN
is unable to change its pairing results unilaterally for higher
utilities. Furthermore, in the perspective of the DSOs, when
the pointers of all FNs have moved to the end of the preference
lists, each DSO has evaluated all proposals from the available
FNs. Therefore, it also cannot unilaterally change its pairing
results, get accepted by the FNs and achieve a higher utility
for itself. Furthermore, according to [6], when every agents
preference list is substitutable, a pairwise stable matching
always exists. Based on the above, the DSO-FN pairing will
ultimately converge and achieve a stable matching result in
Algorithm 2.
C. The Interaction between FNs and DSSs
When the CRBs from FNs have been rent to all DSOs,
within each DSO, how to allocate the CRBs to all DSSs still
remains a problem. According to the rent of all FNs, DSS sj ,
∀j ∈ Υ, has a preference list Lsfj =
[
Lsfj1 , . . . , L
sf
jK
]
on all
FNs in the neighborhood, satisfying,
Lsfkj = −pk, ∀j ∈ Υ, ∀k ∈ Ω. (19)
Furthermore, according to the utility function of the FN,
the distance between the FN and its serving DSS affect the
revenues the FN received. With a longer distance, the FN
has to pay more for the data transmission in the network.
Therefore, we set a preference list Lfsi =
[
Lsfj1 , . . . , L
sf
jK
]
for
FN fk, ∀k ∈ Ω, over all DSSs, i.e.,
Lfskj = −lkj , ∀k ∈ Ω, ∀j ∈ Υ. (20)
Considering the preference lists of DSSs and FNs, i.e., Lsfkj
and Lfskj , respectively, we design a many-to-many matching
algorithm for the FN-DSS pairing problem within DSO di,
∀i ∈ Ψ. As shown in Algorithm 2, after the preference lists are
constructed, we set a pointer for each DSS in its preference list.
Initially, we set the pointer at the first FN in the list. During
the each round of matching, each DSS first proposes to the
FN in the pointer of the preference list. Based on behaviors
of the DSSs, each FN chooses its most preferred DSSs in its
preference list until the maximum CRBs available in the DSO
di are reached. If the DSSs request more CRBs than the FN
7can supply, the FN will reject the less favourite DSSs. At the
end of each round, if the DSSs have been allocated all of its
requested CRBs from the FNs, the pointers of the DSS will
keep unchanged. Otherwise, the pointers of the rejected DSS
will move to the next FN in the preference list. In the next
round, the DSSs which require CRBs will propose to the new
FNs according to their pointers. Specifically, if some CRBs of
FN are allocated to the DSS in the last round, but changed
to other DSSs in the current round, we suppose the pointer
of the DSS in the next round doesn’t change its position,
considering the pointed FN in the current round may be able
to supply more CRBs to the DSS. The matching repeats in
circulations until all the pointers of the DSSs have moved
out their preference list. Following Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
in a similar way, the FN-DSS pairing problem can ultimately
achieve a stable matching result.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present simulation results to evaluate
our proposed framework with MATLAB. In the simulated IoT
scenario, without specific explanation, there are 120 DSSs, 4
DSOs and 20 FNs allocated randomly in a circle district with
a diameter of 10 kilometers. As we focus on the IoT scenarios
where DSSs are closely located with its sensors, without loss
of generality for the methods in this paper, we suppose the
sensors of each DSS are located at the same position with the
DSS. We follow the settings in [7] and set the service rate of
each computing resource block is 0.1 (ms)−1. For each DSS,
the workload arriving rate is a random number averaged 0.5
(ms)−1. The data transmission speed is 50km/ms. The delay
tolerance of all DSSs is set to 60 ms. Furthermore, for each
FN, we set its preference to each DSO as a random number
satisfying the uniform distribution between [0, 1]. Based on the
usage of its computing resources and its service cost, we set
the announced rent as a random number satisfying the uniform
distribution between (0, 10), and the amount of available CRB
as a random number satisfying uniform distribution between
(0, 100). The weight factors α, β and γ are set as 50, 0.01
and 0.001, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 3, we evaluate the utility of all FNs when
the number of DSSs increases. When the number of FNs is
fixed, we discover with the number of DSSs increasing, the
utility of all FNs generally increases, and the increasing speed
first increases then gradually decreases to zero. The reason is
that when the number of DSSs increases, but the number of
FNs is fixed, the FNs will be able to serve more favourable
DSSs with a low transmission distance. However, when all of
the available CRBs of FNs are allocated to the DSSs nearby
and the number of DSS keep increasing, the DSS will be
allocated with CRBs from the massive data centers. Thus, the
total utility of the FNs stop increasing. Nevertheless, when
we increase the number of FNs, we discover that with more
FNs, the utility can converge to a higher bound ultimately.
Furthermore, because of the competition between FNs, when
the number of DSS is small, with more FNs, the increasing
speed is smaller.
In Fig. 4, we consider the utility of all DSSs with the
number of DSSs increasing. In the simulation, we compare
Algorithm 2 Many-to-Many Matching Algorithm for FN-DSS
pairing problem.
1: for DSS sj do
2: Construct the preference list Lsfj on all DSOs according
to (19);
3: One pointer is set as the indicator pointing at the first
FN in the preference list.
4: end for
5: for FN fk do
6: Construct the preference list Lfsk on all FNs according
to (20);
7: end for
8: We set flagj, ∀j ∈ Υ, as the indicator to show if the
FNs allocate CRBs to the DSS sj in the last round, but
adjusted in the current round. Initially, flagj = 1;
9: while the pointers of all DSSs have not scanned all the
FNs in their preference list do
10: DSSs propose to FNs for their services;
11: for DSS sj which has not been allocated required CRBs
do
12: if flagj = 1 then
13: The pointer keep current position in the list;
14: else
15: The pointer moves to the next position in the list;
16: end if
17: The DSS proposes to pointed FN in its preference
list for its data services;
18: We set flagj = 0;
19: end for
20: Each FN determines which DSSs to choose;
21: for FN fk do
22: if The total available CRBs requested by the DSSs
exceed the available volume then
23: The FN fk allocate the CRBs to the most preferred
DSSs, and rejects the rest;
24: For CRBs allocated to the DSS sj in the last round,
but adjusted in the current round, we set flagj =
1;
25: end if
26: end for
27: end while
the performance of the DSSs in our proposed framework with
the performance of the DSSs which is served by the massive
data centers only. With the same amount of workload, we
discover that when the number of DSSs increases, the utility
of DSS genrally increases, and the utility with FNs achieve a
higher value than the one without FNs. Furthermore, when the
number of DSSs is fixed and the average workload for each
DSS increases, the DSSs are able to receive more revenues
from the services. Thus, the utility of DSSs increases.
In Fig. 5, we analyze the relation between the utility of
FNs and average workload arrive rate for DSSs. As shown in
the figure, when the number of FNs is fixed and the average
value of workload λ increases, the utility of FNs first increases
then gradually converge to a fixed value. The reason is that
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when the workload of all DSSs increases, the FNs are able
to allocate more of its CRBs to the DSSs nearby. However,
when all the available CRBs of FNs are allocated to the DSSs,
the utility of the FNs stops improving and converges to one
specific value. When the number of FNs increases, with the
same value of λ, as the FNs are able to provide more CRBs
to the DSSs, the converged value is higher.
In Fig. 6, we observe the utility of all DSOs when the value
of µ increases. As shown in the figure, when µ increases,
each DSS is able to be served with a less amount of CRBs.
Therefore, the DSO is able to set a higher price to the DSSs
and receive high revenues. Moreover, when the number of
DSSs increases, as the DSO is able to serve more DSSs at the
same time, the total utility of DSOs also increases.
In Fig. 7, we evaluate the relationship of utilities and the
tolerance service delay tth of DSSs. As shown in the Fig. 7a,
when the value of tth increases, each DSS is able to be served
with less CRBs. Thus, the FNs will supply less CRBs in the
network, and the utility of the FNs generally decreases. In Fig.
7a, as the DSO is able set a high price for its services, with the
value of tth increasing, the utility of DSO generally increases.
Moreover, in Fig. 7c, even though the DSS is able purchase
less CRBs with high tth, the price of CRBs set by the DSOs
also increases. Furthermore, as the DSS suffers a lot with high
Average Value of λ (ms)-1
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Ut
ilit
y 
of
 F
Ns
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
Number of FNs = 30
Number of FNs = 25
Number of FNs = 20
Fig. 5: The utility of all FNs versus the average value of λ
µ (ms)-1
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Ut
ilit
y 
of
 D
SO
s
×106
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Number of DSSs =240
Number of DSSs =180
Number of DSSs =120
Fig. 6: The utility of all DCOs versus the value of µ
delay, the utility of DSS generally decreases with the value of
tth increasing.
VI. RELATED WORKS
In the literature, fog computing has been advocated to be
the promising future of the cloud. The concept of pulling
the cloud closer to the users has been widely considered in
previous work. In [8], the authors put forward the concept
of mist computing, aiming to distribute the cloud and its
benefits deeply into the network. In [9], the deployment of
edge cloud was proposed. From the DSSs’ side, the edge
cloud was able to surrogate the requirements and simplify
the management of the network. From the servers’ side, the
edge cloud can exploit content and support service delivery
in an efficient way. Without deploying massive data centers
with high cost and latency, [10] on the other hand strength-
ened the importance of small distributed data center designs.
The authors took email delivery as an example and showed
the advantages of geo-diversity characteristics of micro data
centers. In [11], a novel and distributed computing platform,
called nano data centers was proposed. The authors evaluated
the energy consumption of nano data centers and showed a
significant improvement on energy efficiency, compared with
the traditional data centers. In [12], considering the existing
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telecommunication and Internet service providers, the authors
showed that it was required and beneficial to leverage the
existing infrastructure and provide value-added services with
FNs. In [13], the authors outlined the vision of fog computing
and overviewed the important features of fog computing.
In [14], the network optimization with fog computing was
considered. As the data centers were aware of the locations of
DSSs with fog computing, dynamic adaptation of computing
resources to the DSSs’ conditions was proposed. In [15], the
authors compared the cloud computing with the fog computing
and showed some significant characteristics of fog, which
was required for current data services. In [16], the authors
elaborated the role of fog computing in six important scenarios
and surveyed the security issues with fog computing.
Moreover, fog computing has been widely considered to
be beneficial for the IoT. In [17], the authors overview the
opportunities and challenges of fog, especially the applications
of fog computing in IoT. In [18], the authors devise the method
of MEdia FOg Resource Estimation (MeFoRE), to provide
resource estimation based on the service give-up ratio and
to enhance QoS based on the previous QoE. [19] addresses
the utility based pairing problem between the fog nodes and
IoT devices with the Irving’s matching algorithm. In [20], the
authors propose a distributed dataflow programming model
for IoT devices to optimize resource allocation on computing
infrastructures across the fog and the cloud. In [21], the authors
consider issues of resource prediction, customer type based
resource estimation and reservation, advance reservation, and
pricing in the fog computing for IoTs. [22] considers the
requirements of mobility, scalability, reliable control and ac-
tuation in some challenging scenarios of IoT to show the
benefits and significance of fog computing. Considering the
advantages of fog computing, the authors in [23] discuss and
propose a procedure to be implemented in smart phones for
UV measurement.
In order to solve the resource management problems in
a network system with a distributed fashion, game theory
has been shown as a powerful tool [24]. In the literature,
most of the cases, the network system is normally modeled
as a bipartite or a multi-tier graph. Based on this model,
in [25], a Stackelberg game theoretic model was shown for
dynamic bandwidth allocation between virtual networks. In
[26], the authors consider a Stackelberg game between data
center and buses in the smart city, where each buses collect
data along its route and compete with other buses for the
reward forwarding to the data center. In the game, following
the proposed heuristic algorithm, the Stackelberg equilibrium
is shown to be achieved where the data center and each bus are
able to reach maximum utility. In [27], the authors formulate
a Stackelberg game for power allocation of data centers in the
cloud. In the game, the power grid controller acts as the leader
and sets prices of the provided energy based on the current
amount of renewable energy and costs. Observing the prices,
the cloud controller, i.e., the follower, determines the optimal
amount of enery to purchase and do resource allocation for
its data centers. With backward induction, the near-optimal
strategies of both players in the game can be achieved. In [28],
the authors model the interaction between the monopolistic
data center opertor and the customers as a Stackelberg game.
In the game, the pricing strategies of the monopolistic data
center operator the corresponding behavior of data service
customers is detailedly analyzed in both homogeneous and
heterogeneous customer scenarios. In [29], the authors adopted
the Stackelberg game to solve the problem of minimizing
energy consumption in the data center networks. In [30], the
authors proposed a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg
game to address and cooperation problems among Wi-Fi, small
cell and macrocell networks. In [31], the authors combined
the Stackelberg game and the bargaining to design a resource
allocation problem in a multi-tier LTE unlicensed network.
Furthermore, the auction mechanisms are also powerful tools
to solve the problem. In [32]–[34], the resource management
problem could be perfectly optimized, but it requires high
communication and computation overhead. In [35], the authors
adopted the generic game theoretic framework to identify
important edges in the context of k-edge connectivity between
certain pairs of nodes in a general given network. In [36],
the graphical game was put forward to analyze the optimized
behaviors of each node in a general graph.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a joint optimization framework
in the multi-FN, multi-DSO and multi-DSS scenario for IoT
fog computing. In the framework, we first modeled the Stack-
elberg games to solve the pricing problem of the DSOs and
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resource purchasing problem of the DSSs. Then a many-to-
many matching was proposed between the DSOs and the FNs
to deal with the DSO-FN pairing problem. Finally, we applied
another many-to-many matching between its paired FNs and
serving DSSs to solve the FN-DSS pairing problem within
the same DSO. For each stage of the problem, all participants
were able to achieve the equilibrium or stable results where
no one was able to change its behavior unilaterally for a
higher utility. Simulation results showed that all FNs, DSOs
and DCOs were able to reach optimal utilities for themselves,
and high performance of the proposed framework could be
achieved compared with the data services without fog nodes.
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